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ABSTRACT
CHARACTERIZATION OF ENVY FREE
SOLUTIONS FOR QUEUING PROBLEMS
Esmerok, I˙brahim Barıs
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisors: Assist. Prof. Dr. Tarık Kara
September 2006
In this study we are working on queuing problems. In our model a solution
to a queuing problem is an ordering of agents and a transfer vector where the
sum of the transfers of agents is equal to zero. Hence a queuing problem is a
double, where we have a finite set of agents and a profile of payoff functions of
agents which represent their preferences on their orderings and transfers. We
are assuming that the payoff functions of agents are quasi-linear on transfers.
Our main aim is to find envy free solutions for queuing problems. Since payoff
functions of agents are quasi-linear envy freeness implies Pareto efficiency. For
problems where there are less than five agents, we show that the set of envy
free solutions is not empty and we are able to characterize the envy free
solutions. We conjecture that our results may be extended to general case
similar to our extension from three person case to four person case. When
we assume that a queuing problem satisfies order preservation property we
are able to characterize envy free solutions with a solution concept that we
introduce in this study.
Keywords: Queuing Problems, No-envy.
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O¨ZET
SIRALAMA PROBLEMLERI˙NDE KISKANC¸LIGI
O¨NLEYEN C¸O¨ZU¨MLERI˙N KARAKTERI˙ZASYONU
Esmerok, I˙brahim Barıs
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Yrd. Doc¸. Dr. Tarık Kara
Eylu¨l 2006
Bu c¸alısmada sıralama problemlerinde kis¸iler arasında kıskanc¸lıg˘ı o¨nleyen
c¸o¨zu¨mler u¨zerinde c¸alıs¸ılmıs¸tır. Bizim c¸alıs¸mamızda kis¸i ku¨meleri sabit tu-
tulmus¸ ve kis¸ilerin sıralamalar ve transferler u¨zerinde ki tercihlerini go¨steren
deg˘er fonksiyonları transferlerde quasi-linear kabul edilmis¸tir. Deg˘er fonksiy-
onları transferlerde quasi-linear varsayıldıg˘ı ic¸in bir c¸o¨zu¨mu¨n kıskanc¸lıg˘ı
o¨nleyen bir c¸o¨zu¨m olması onun Pareto en iyi olmasını da yanında ge-
tirmektedir. Bu c¸alıs¸mada do¨rt ya da do¨rtten daha az kis¸inin ele alındıg˘ı
problemlerde kıskanc¸lıg˘ı o¨nleyen c¸o¨zu¨mler ku¨mesinin bos¸ olmadıg˘ı ve bu
c¸o¨zu¨mlerin karakterize edilebileceg˘i go¨sterilmektedir. Ele alınan problem-
lerin sıralamayı koruma o¨zellig˘ini sag˘laması durumunda ise kıskanc¸lıg˘ı o¨nleyen
c¸o¨zu¨mlerin karaterizaysonu bu c¸alıs¸mada o¨nerilen c¸o¨zu¨m kavramı sayesinde
sag˘lanabilmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sıralama Problemleri, kıskanc¸lıg˘ı o¨nleyen c¸o¨zu¨mler
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Getting into queues and waiting for other people to complete their jobs to be
able to execute one’s own job is a familiar phenomenon to every one. Think
of a facility which is capable of processing a certain job. People apply to
the facility with jobs which last for a a certain amount of time. The total
amount of time needed to execute jobs of all applicants could be greater than
the capacity of the facility. So a facility may fail to process all of the jobs,
or some of the jobs would be partially processed by the facility. Everyone
would like to have their jobs processed as much as possible. For example in
libraries there are some materials which students would like to use extensively
especially when examinations are coming, but libraries usually do have a copy
or two. In such cases libraries usually make this material available only in
library use and put time quotas to students. Most of the students in such
times are able to use the material less than they have planned. Thus whenever
a group of people aim to use such facility the available usage time for each
individual should be indicated. Most of the time facilities process jobs one by
one so one may have to wait for other person’s job to be processed. Everyone
would like to wait as little as possible. Most of the computer laboratories has
only one super computer. Students in laboratory sessions would like to use
the super computer but the length of the session would be less than the total
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amount of time that students request to use the computer. In this case an
arrangement of computer usage times is necessary. Since there is only one
computer, students should use the computer one by one. Hence, besides an
arrangement of computer usage times a computer using schedule, an ordering,
is needed too. Whenever such a problem is faced, the planner of the facility
should come up with how much of the requested jobs of each agent will be
processed and in which order they will be processed.
The scenarios in the previous paragraph are examples of queuing problems.
A problem is considered as a queuing problem whenever there is a facility
which is capable of processing jobs one by one and there is a group of agents
who has requested jobs from the facility. In the literature queuing problems
are studied under different models. The difference between these models are
usually on whether the facility has a limited capacity or not, and whether
individuals have identical job lengths or not. In the model that Maniquet
(2003), Chun (2004a), and Kayi & Ramaekers (2006) studies the capacity of
the facility is unlimited, and job lengths of agents are identical. In Moulin
(2004), Moulin (2005), and O¨zsoy (2005)’s model again the capacity of the
facility is unlimited, but this time agents may have different job lengths. At
first glance the first class of problems may be perceived as the subset of the
second one, but the assumptions on preferences of agents in these two models
are not in line with this perception. In the second model agents account for
the time they wait similarly, it costs a dollar for each unit of time that they
wait for. In the first model waiting cost of a unit of time could be different
for the agents. Hence the first model considers more general preferences than
the second one. Another important aspect of both of the models is that all
jobs should be fully processed.
As an example to the first model we can think of a group of tourists who
joins to a travel agency’s trip to a certain touristic site. When this group
arrives to their hotel they should be checked in to the hotel. Checking in
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procedure is more or less a standard procedure, so all tourists’ requested job
lengths are identical. Even though their requested job lengths are equal some
individuals may think that after a long trip to the destination waiting for
others to check in is more costly than others think, so waiting cost of a unit
of time is different for everyone. An uncompleted checking in procedure is
meaningless hence everyone’s job should be fully processed.
A situation where a group of wounded men are brought to a hospital from
a combat zone can be thought of an example for the second model. The time
needed for minimal amount of medical treatment for each soldier would differ
so requested job lengths of agents are different than each other. Not even
getting the minimal amount of medical treatment does not mean much for a
wounded soldier so partially processing a job is meaningless. Since all agents
are in an urgent situation it can be considered that they should all get the
treatment as quick as possible so they account the time they wait similarly.
Moulin (2004), Moulin (2005), and O¨zsoy (2005) characterize solution
concepts which are immune to certain maneuvers by a group or groups of
agents. The motivation behind these maneuvers are agents’ aim to get higher
benefits. Merging, splitting, and partial transferring of jobs are among these
maneuvers. Before preceding to the results of their articles an understanding
of these maneuvers is beneficial.
Merging is the case where a group of people choose an individual from
their group; that individual declares a job length which is equal to the sum
of the job lengths of the individuals in that group. Obviously if a scheduling
rule favors longer jobs in ordering the agents, merging will be beneficial.
Splitting is the converse of merging. If an agent with a positive job length
finds a group of agents who does not have any jobs to do or in other words
who have job lengths equal to zero, the agent with the positive job length
divides his job length into smaller time slots and distributes them to agents
who have job lengths equal to zero. They all declare that they have such jobs
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to do. In this case if a scheduling rule favors shorter jobs, splitting would be
beneficial under that rule.
Partial transferring of jobs is sort of in between merging and splitting.
In this case a group of agents reallocate their job lengths, and try to benefit
from it. It is clear that some agents can take more advantegous positions in
the queue by using such maneuvers. Thus characterizing a scheduling rule
which is invulnerable to such maneuvers is desirable.
Moulin (2004), Moulin (2005), focuses on these maneuvers. Before dis-
cussing Moulin’s findings it would be wise to make a distinction between his
works on this subject. Moulin makes a main distinction between types of
scheduling rules. A scheduling rule is deterministic if a planner assigns a
schedule to each problem. Under deterministic rules agents know their exact
places in the queue. A scheduling rule is non-deterministic or randomized if
a planner assigns a probability distribution over all possible orderings. Under
randomized rules agents do not know their exact places in the queue but they
know with which probability they will be in any place of the queue.
Moulin (2005) deals with deterministic rules. He assumes that users have
identical linear waiting costs. In this context, if an ordering minimizes the
sum of waiting times of agents it is called an efficient schedule. To minimize
the sum of waiting times an ordering should schedule shorter jobs earlier than
longer jobs. Moulin points out that any efficient deterministic scheduling
rule will fail to satisfy merge-proofness or split-proofness. To overcome this
drawback he introduces scheduling fees or in other words monetary transfers
to the model.
Moulin defines monetary transfers as taking money from some individuals
and giving money to others. He designs this transfers in a way that sum of
tranfers is equal to zero, hence situations where money collected is greater
than money allocated or vice versa are ruled out. After adding possibility
of transfers to the model agents start to consider the time they will wait
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until their job is executed and their monetary transfer. To be able to form
a link between waiting times of individuals and their transfers Moulin makes
further assumptions. He assumes that each individual is incuring a waiting
cost of a dollar per unit of time until his job is completed. Thus the cost of
an individual is his waiting time minus his transfer.
Moulin introduces the concepts of scheduling mechanisms and scheduling
methods. A mechanism assigns an ordering of the agents and a tranfer vector
to each problem. A method assigns a profile of net waiting costs to each
problem. The sum of the waiting costs is equal to the sum of the requested
job lengths of agents plus sum of the net waiting times of each agents. Net
waiting time of an agent in a certain ordering is the sum of the job lengths
of agents who preceed him in that ordering. Since a mechanism assigns an
ordering of the agents and a tranfer vector, by adding the transfer of an
agent to his waiting time we can find his waiting cost and by subtracting his
requested job length from his waiting cost we reach to his net waiting cost.
So to any given mechanism a method can be associated.
Equal treatment of equals, and continuity are among nice properties which
a scheduling rule may satisfy. A mechanism satisfies equal treatment of equals
(ETE) if the requested job lengths of any two agents are equal then their
induced waiting costs are equal. A mechanism is continuous if mapping from
requested job lengths to waiting costs is continuous.
Moulin shows that when there are more than four agents any efficient
mechanism satisfying equal treatment of equals cannot be both merge-proof
and split-proof. Replacing equal treatment of equals with continuoutiy leads
to the same outcome. In other words if one wants a mechanism to be both
merge-proof and split-proof then this mechanism will fail to satisfy both equal
treament of equals and continuity.
Another contribution of this paper is about relationships between merge-
proofness, split-proofness and some equity conditions. These equity condi-
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tions are:
Stand alone bound ; A method satisfies stand alone bound if for any agent,
the total waiting cost plus his transfer is greater than or equal to his
requested job length.
Ranking : A method satisfies ranking if agent i’s requested job length is less
than or equal to agent j’s requested job length then agent i’s cost is
less than or equal to agent j’s cost.
Monotonicity : A method satisfies monotonicity if requested job length of
an agent increases, his cost increases or stays the same.
No charge for null jobs: A method satisfies no charge for null jobs if an
agent’s requested job length approaches to zero his cost approaches to
zero.
Finite liability : A method satisfies finite liability if all agents’ costs are
strictly less than infinity.
Moulin states that whenever there are more than four potential users; any
efficient, continuous, split-proof mechanism which satisfies equal treatment
of equals fails to satisfy stand alone bound, ranking, and monotonicity. Fur-
thermore, if the set of potential users is infinite it fails to satisfy no charge
for null jobs and finite liability.
Moulin defines a continuous function Θ : R2++ → R for all a, b ∈ R+
Θ(a, b) + Θ(b, a) = min{a, b}. He designs two methods named S+ and S−.
These two methods are Θ-separable scheduling methods. Respectively they
are associated with Θ+ and Θ− which we define as : for all a, b ∈ R+
Θ+(a, b) =
1
2
min{a, b}
Θ−(a, b) =
1
2
max{a, b}.
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It turns out that S+ is merge-proof, and S− is split-proof. Hence S− violates
the equity tests which are stated above, but S+ satisfies all of them.
Moulin works on partial transfer of jobs mainly by taking into account
the cases where transfers are only between two agents. He first defines -
shrink and -spread of a problem. In forming the -shrink of a problem, take
two agents and keep the requested job lengths of the other agents constant,
partially transfer some job from the one of the two agents who has a higher
job length to the other one in a way that the one who has a higher job length
in the beginning still has a higher job length. The -spread of a problem is
similar to the -shrink of a problem. In -spread of a problem the transfer
is from the agent with a smaller job length to the one who has a higher
job length. A mechanism is pairwise shrink-proof whenever for all problems,
and for all -shrinks of that problem, total waiting costs of agents in the
original problem is less than or equal to the total waiting costs of individuals
in the transformed problem minus . A mechanism is pairwise spread-proof
whenever for all problems, and for all -spreads of that problem, total waiting
costs of agents in the original problem is less than or equal to the total
waiting costs of agents in the transformed problem plus  plus sum of the
requested job lengths of agnets in between agents who has created -spread.
A mechanism is called pairwise transfer-proof if it is both pairwise shrink-
proof and pairwise transfer-proof. Moulin characterizes the mechanism S+
by efficiency, continuity, pairwise transfer-proofness, and by the stand alone
bound or no charge for null jobs. As a final contribution he states that if there
are more than three users any efficient and continuos mechanism is vulnerable
to job transfers involving two or three agents.
Moulin (2004) studies randomized rules. Just like Moulin (2005) there are
infinite number of potential users, and a group of people from that group uses
the facility. Each agent has a non-negative requested job length. The crucial
difference between Moulin (2004) and Moulin (2005) is that in Moulin (2005)
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there are no transfers in the model instead there is a probability distribution
over the set of possible orderings. A scheduling rule assigns a probability
distribution over the set of orderings to every problem. Naturally agents in
this model consider the expected completion time of their jobs. For each
agent having a smaller expected waiting time is better than a longer one. A
scheduling method assigns a profile of expected waiting times to each problem.
Moulin defines quasi-proportional rules. He defines ω which is a function
on R+ such that ω(0) = 0 and for all a > 0 ω(a) > 0. Let x be the vector of
requested job lengths of agents, for a requested job length vector such that all
of the agents have job lengths greater than zero and for all z ≥ 0 a ω-quasi-
proportional rule draws as many as the cardinalty of the users independent
random variables Zi with respective cumulative distribution functions Fi(z) =
min{zω(xi), 1} for all z ≥ 0 and orders jobs accordingly to the realization of
these variables by breaking ties arbitrarly with uniform probability. When
x ≥ 0 and there are some components of x equal to 0 these agents with zero
requested job lengths are ordered before the ones with positive requested job
lengths.
If for all a > 0 we have ω(a) = a then this ω-quasi-proportional rule is
the proportional rule. Proportional rule assigns a probability distribution to
set of orderings. The probability of agent i being last ordered is calculated
by dividing the requested job length of agent i to the sum of requested job
lengths of all agents. The probability that agent j ordered just before last
ordered agent i is equal to the requested job length of agent j over sum of
the requested job lengths of all agents besides agent i. Hence for a given
ordering the probability that agent l being in his place in that given ordering
is equal to the requested job length of agent l over the sum of requested job
lengths of agents preceding agent l plus the requested job length of agent l.
So the probability of occurance of an ordering is calculated by multiplying
probabilities of each agent being in his position in that ordering. Other well
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known rules can also be expressed as special cases of ω-quasi-proportional
rules. If for all a > 0 we have ω(a) = 1 then this ω-quasi-proportional rule
is the uniform rule where probability of each ordering is equal. If for all
a > 0 we have ω(a) = aα, where α ∈ R. When the limit of α goes to +∞
then this ω-quasi-proportional rule is the shortest job first rule where only
possible orderings are the ones in which jobs are ordered from shortest job
to longest one with equal probability. When the limit of α goes to −∞ then
this ω-quasi-proportional rule is the longest job first rule where only possible
orderings are the ones in which jobs are ordered from longest job to shortest
one with equal probability.
Moulin defines recursivity, a scheduling rule is recursive if for all prob-
lems there exists a probability distribution over set of possible orderings such
that probability of an order is equal to probability that last ordered agent is
ordered last times the porbabilty of occurance of the rest of the queue. The
second one is seperability, a scheduling rule is separable if for all problems and
all subsets of the set of users of the facility the random ordering of the jobs
in the subset of users is independent of the jobs outside the subset. The third
one is the well known anonymity axiom. A scheduling rule is anonoymous
if agents’ names are not important, i.e., the only important characteristic of
a participant is his requested job length, the last one is the positivity prop-
erty which may be interpreted as: for any requested job length profile any
agent has a chance to precede any other agent. Moulin characterizes quasi-
proportional rules by a combination of seperability, recursivity, anonymity,
and the positivity property
In Moulin (2005) merge-proofness and split-proofness were the main ob-
jects of attention. Just like Moulin (2005), Moulin (2004) handles these ma-
neuvers. Moulin defines demand monotonicity and explores merge-proofness
in terms of demand monotonicity and previously defined properties. A
scheduling method is demand monotonic if for all problems and for all agents
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expected wait of an agent minus his requested job length is non decresing in
his requested job length. In other words whenever an agent’s requested job
length increses his net expected waiting time does not decrease. A scheduling
rule is called demand monotonic whenever the associated method is demand
monotonic. Moulin proposes that:
1. An ω-separable scheduling method is demand monotonic if and only if
the probability that agent i follows agent j where agent j has a positive
requested job length is non decreasing in agent i’s requested job length.
2. An ω-separable scheduling rule is demand monotonic if and only if ω is
nondecreasing.
As his main result Moulin states that an anonymous, demand monotonic,
and separable scheduling method is merge-proof, so a demand monotonic
quasi-proportional rule is merge-proof.
A method is merge-invariant if for all problems expected waiting times of
agents before merging is equal to the expected waiting times of agents after
merging. Uniform method is the only merge-invariant scheduling method.
Moulin explores split-proofness, and he makes characterizations of sepa-
rable split-proof scheduling rules, and recursive scheduling rules. He states
that a separables scheduling rule is split-proof if and only if the corresponding
method is split-proof and a technical property is satisfied. Moulin adds that
a ω-quasi-proportional rule is split-proof if and only if ω is subadditive. A
recursive scheduling rule is split-proof when one of the agents splits his job
into pieces the probability that another job is scheduled last does not become
greater.
Moulin defines a new property, ranking. A scheduling method meets rank-
ing if an agent i’s requested job length is greater than or equal to agent j’s
requested job length then agent i’s expected net waiting time is greater than
or equal to agent j’s expected net waiting time. Moulin states that an anony-
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mous ω-separable method meets ranking if and only if the probability that
agent i follows agent j where agent j has a positive requested job length is
non decreasing in agent i’s job length and it is less than or equal to agent
i’s requested job length over agent i’s requested job length plus other agent’s
requested job length.
As a final contribution Moulin introduces split-invariance property, a
scheduling rule is split-invariant if for all problems and all agents the agent
who splits his job does not gain or lose with respect to not splitting his job.
Moulin states that
1. If a separable scheduling rule is split-invariant then its method is pro-
portional.
2. The proportional rule is the only recursive and split-invariant scheduling
rule.
O¨zsoy (2005) considers another maneuver named coordinated splitting.
By coordinated splitting it is meant that at least two different agents split their
jobs and make a contract between themselves. This contract may be imagined
as agents switch their places in the queue with a certain probability in favor
of one of the agents. Whenever only two agents take action in coordinated
splitting it is called pairwise splitting.
The main result of this article is that whenever there are infinite number
of potential users. A separable and anonymous scheduling rule is demand
monotonic and coordinated split-proof if and only if its corresponding method
is uniform. zsoy introduces a new property named population monotonicity.
By population monotonicity it is ment that for all problems and for all agents
if a new agent joins to the group the expected costs of all agents in the
original problem are less than or equal to their costs in the new problem. She
states another theorem: an anonymous, separable, and population monotonic
scheduling rule is demand monotonic and coordinated split-proof if and only
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if its associated method is uniform.
No-envy is a well known criterion of fairness. By no-envy it is meant that
non of the agents prefer the the ordering and the transfer of another agent to
his own ordering and transfer. The concept of no-envy is applicable to queuing
problems. Youngsub Chun in Chun (2004b) works on this subject. Before
discussing this article mentioning Maniquet (2003) will be enlightening.
In Maniquet (2003) just like the models in previous articles there is a
group of agents who wants to use a facility which has an unlimited capacity
and transfers are designed in the same way. Agents should use the facility one
by one. Hence the planner of the facility should order the agents and assign
monetary transfers between them. Unlike the previous models job lengths of
agents are same, and each person is identified with an impatience level. The
impatience level of an agent is the cost he incurs while waiting for another
agent. The waiting cost of an agent is the number of people he waits times
his impatience level. A solution to a queuing problem in this model is an
ordering of agents and a profile of transfers. Each agent’s payoff is linear and
accounted by subtracting his waiting cost from his transfer.
An allocation is an ordering of agents and a profile of transfers. An allo-
cation is feasible if no two people get the same place in the queue and sum of
transfers is less than or equal to zero. It is efficient if the sum of waiting costs
of individuals in the induced ordering is less than or equal to waiting costs
of individuals in any other possible ordering and sum of transfers is equal to
zero. Hence for an allocation to be efficient the induced ordering should order
agents starting from the one who has the greatest impatience level to the one
who has the lowest impatience level by breaking ties arbitrarily.
Maniquet forms a link between well-known concept from cooperative
games Shapley value and queuing problems. The spirit of Shapley value is
to account an agent’s marginal contribution to a coalition. Take a group of
people if they are producing something. Their production is the value of their
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group, and this value can be distributed between the individuals forming the
group. Shapley value for a member of the group is the weighted sum of that
agent’s marginal contribution to each coalition. A coalition is a subgroup of
agents in that group.
Maniquet defines valuations for coalitions to be able to use Shapley value
concept. There would be different valuations for coalitions. He introduces
two different valuation methods. First he takes a coalition and assumes that
this coalition is served earlier than the rest of the agents. He takes an efficient
queue in that coalition and sums up the waiting costs of the agents in that
coalition according that efficient queue. He calls that sum the value of that
coalition. In his second approach, he orders the entire group efficiently then
sums up the waiting costs of the agents in the colaition according to that
efficient ordering and he adds the incremental cost that coalition imposes on
non-members. He calls this sum the value of the coalition. The cost incre-
mented by a coalition to a nonmember of a coalition is sum of the requested
job lengths of coalition members that preceed that nonmember. The sum of
that costs is the incremental cost that coalition imposes on non-members. By
using this valuations of coalitions Maniquet finds Shapley values of agents.
Maniquet shows that this two approaches of valuation is dual hence Shapley
values will be equal for each agent in both approaches. He states that if an al-
location gives agents the payoffs corresponding to Shapley value then induced
ordering will be efficient and induced transfer for each agent will be equal to
half of his own waiting cost minus sum of half of the impatience levels of the
agents that follow him.
As a final contribution Maniquet defines nine axioms and characterizes
Shapley value in queuing problems in terms of those axioms. Effciency and
feasibility are in those nine axioms. The others are:
Pareto indifference: A solution concept satisfies Pareto indifference if it
selects all the allocations which give the same payoff to all agents with
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an allocation which that solution concept has already chosen.
Anonymity : A solution concept satisfies anonymity if changing the names
of agents does not effect the selection of that concept.
Equal treatment of equals: A solution concept satisfies equal treatment of
equals whenever the payoffs of the agents with same impatience levels
are equal.
Identical preferences lower bound : A solution concept satisfies identi-
cal preferences lower bound if for any queuing problem agent i’s payoff is
greater than or equal to the payoff he gets under the problem where all
other agents’ impatience levels are equal to agent i’s impatience level.
Negative cost monotonicity : A solution concept satisfies negative cost
monotonicity if agent i becomes more impatient while other agents’
impatience levels stays the same then all the agents besides agent i gets
better-off.
Independence of preceding costs: A solution concept satisfies indepen-
dence of preceding costs if agent i’s impatience level increases while the
other agents’ impatience levels stays the same, the payoffs of the agents
who are queued after agent i in the original problem are not effected.
Last agent equal responsibility : A solution concept satisfies last agent
equal responsibility if the agent who is queued last in the original prob-
lem leaves the set of users of the facility, the remaining agents’ relative
place in the queue stays the same and they share his transfer equally in
the solution of the new problem.
Maniquet’s charaterizetion result is the equivalance of the statements for a
solution concept:
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i. For all problems, solution concept Θ selects all the allocations assigning
to the agents payoffs corresponding to the Shapley value of the queuing
problem where coaltions are valued in Maniquet’s way.
ii. Θ satisfies efficiency, anonymity, equal treatment of equals, and inde-
pendence of preceding costs.
iii. Θ satisfies feasibility, Pareto indifference, identical preferences lower
bound, negative cost monotonicity, and last agent equal responsibility.
iv. Among the solution concepts satisfying feasibility, Pareto indifference,
identical preferences lower bound, and last agent equal responsibility,
Θ minimizes the sum of absolute values of the transfers.
In Chun (2004a) the model in Maniquet (2003) is used but different val-
uation of coalitions is introduced. Chun takes a coalition and assumes that
the coalition is served later than rest of the group. He considers that the
coalition in itself is queued efficiently then he sums up the waiting costs of
the agents who are in coalition. Like in Maniquet’s approach this sum is
used as the value of a coalition to find Shapley values of the agents. Similar
to previous paper if an allocation gives agents the payoffs corresponding to
Shapley value then induced ordering is efficient and this time induced transfer
for each agent will be equal to sum of the half of impatience levels of agents
that precede him minus number of people waiting him times half of his own
impatience level. The only diffence between these two papers is whether the
coalition is served first or last. Again like Maniquet, Chun characterizes his
rule with nine axioms which are similar to Maniquet’s. Like his approach his
axioms are in a way reverse of Maniquet’s. The first six axioms of Chun are
same as Maniquet’s first six axioms but he uses positive cost monotonicity
instead of negative cost monotonicity, independence of following costs instead
of indepence of preceding costs, first agent equal responsibility instead of last
agent equal responsibility.
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Positive cost monotonicity : A solution concept satisfies positive cost
monotonicity if agent i becomes more impatient while other agents’
impatience levels stays the same then all the agents besides agent i gets
worse-off.
Independence of following costs: A solution concept satisfies indepen-
dence of following costs if agent i’s impatience level increases while the
other agents’ impatience levels stays the same, the payoffs of the agents
who are queued before agent i in the original problem are not effected.
First agent equal responsibility : A solution concept satisfies first agent
equal responsibility if the agent who is queued first in the original prob-
lem leaves the set of users of the facility, the remaining agents’ relative
place in the queue stays the same and they share his transfer equally in
the solution of the new problem.
Maniquet’s charaterizetion result is the equivalance of the statements for a
solution concept:
i. For all problems, solution concept Θ selects all the allocations assigning
to the agents payoffs corresponding to the Shapley value of the queuing
problem where coaltions are valued in Chun’s way.
ii. Θ satisfies efficiency, Pareto indifference, equal treatment of equals, and
independence of following costs.
iii. Θ satisfies feasibility, Pareto indifference, identical preferences lower
bound, positive cost monotonicity, and first agent equal responsibility.
iv. Among the solution concepts satisfying feasibility, Pareto indifference,
identical preferences lower bound, and first agent equal responsibility,
Θ maximizes the sum of absolute values of the transfers.
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Chun (2004b) considers the same model as in Maniquet (2003), and Chun
(2004a). Chun characterizes solution concepts satisfying Pareto efficiency,
and envy freeness. Due to simplicity of payoff functions in this setup, they
are characterized by ordering agents starting from the one with the highest
impatience level to the one with lowest impatience level; and arranging trans-
fers in a way that difference between transfers of two agents where one follows
the other is less than or equal to the impatience level of the one who is ahead
and greater than or equal to the one who is behind.
The other contributions of Chun in this article are negative results. It
is stated in Chun that when there are more than two agents there is no
solution concept which is Pareto efficient, envy-free, negative or positive cost
monotonic. Again when there are more than two agents there is no solution
concept satisfying Pareto efficiency, no-envy, and independence of following
or preceding costs.
After reaching such negative results Chun modificates the concept of no-
envy as backward, and forward no envy. A solution concept satisfies backward
no-envy if none of the agents envy another agent who has a lower impatience
level. A solution concept satidfies forward no-envy if none of the agents envy
another agent who has higher impatience level. Chun states that Maniquet
rule satisfies backward no-envy and his rule satisfies forward no-envy.
Kayi & Ramaekers (2006) concetrates on strategy-proffness in queuing
problem. A solution concept satidfies strategy-proofness if an agent revels a
different impatience level instead of his real impatience level he does not get
better-off.
Kayi & Ramaekers (2006) introduces non-bossiness. A solution concept
satisfies non-bossiness if there is no agent who can effect the allocation of
other agents by announcing a different impatiance level for himself without
affecting his own allocation. They state that there is no solution concept
satisfying Pareto efficiency, strategy proofness, and non-bossiness.
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Besides this negative result Kayi & Ramaekers (2006) revisits Mitra and
Sen’s rule which is proposing efficient orderings and letting transfer of agent
i equal to sum of impatience levels of agents who are ordered before agent i
times number of people they wait for divided by number of agents minus two
minus sum of impatience levels of agents who are ordered after agent i times
number of agents they wait starting from agent i divided by number of agents
minus two. Mitra and Sen’s rule is strategy-proof. Kayi and Ramaekers
concetrates on properties of Mitra and Sen’s rule in the rest of the paper.
I am considering a different model than the models that has been discussed
above. Under my model the capacity of the facility is unlimited. This is in line
with all of the models that we have discussed so far. Like Maniquet (2003)’s,
Chun (2004a)’s, and Kayi & Ramaekers (2006)’s articles the job lengths of
agents are identical. The difference in my model is about the preferences of
agents. I am only assuming that all of the agents prefer being in an earlier
position in an ordering to being in later position. Hence, waiting cost of
a unit of time may be different for all agents, and for an agent the cost of
waiting the same amount of time in a different place in the queue may be
different.(for example an agent may think that, waiting the first ordered agent
while being second ordered is more costly than waiting the fourth ordered
agent while being fifth ordered) I am adding transfers to the model just like
the previous authors has done. My main aim in my study is to characterize
the envy free solutions. Besides I am imposing a another assumption on
preferences of agents ,namely order preservation property, which still keeps
the preferences of the agents more general than previous papers’ models.
Order preservation property says that if agent i values the difference between
two consecutive positions more than agent j does, then agent i will keep
valuing the difference between consecutive positions which come later in the
queue greater than or equal to agent j values. In the set of problems where
order preservation property is satisfied I again search for the characterization
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of envy free solutions.
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Chapter 2
MODEL AND RESULTS
2.1 THE MODEL AND BASIC DEFINI-
TIONS
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents where n = |N |. The agents in the
set N request from a facility to process their jobs. We will assume that the
job lengths of all agents are equal, the facility has unlimited capacity, and it
can process jobs one at a time. Let Nn denote the positive integers up to n.
An ordering of the agents in N is one-to-one function σ : N → Nn. Let Π(N)
denote the of set orderings of N . For any i ∈ N and for any σ ∈ Π(N), σi is
the position of agent i in the ordering σ. For any a ∈ Nn, σ−1(a) denotes the
agent who is placed in the ath position in the ordering σ. Let t ∈ Rn denote
the vector of transfers. If for some i ∈ N we have ti > 0, then it means that
agent i is receiving ti units of money; if ti < 0, then it means that agent i
is paying ti units of money. The sum of the transfers of the agents,
∑
i∈N ti,
is the budget of the facility. If
∑
i∈N ti = 0, then we say that the budget is
balanced, hence in total money collected is equal to money distributed. Let
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BB denote the set of budget balanced transfer vectors, i.e.,
BB = {t ∈ Rn|
∑
i∈N
ti = 0}.
Now we are faced with the problem of ordering agents and arranging
transfers between them. Hence a pair (σ, t) ∈ Π(N)×BB is a solution to the
problem faced by the group N . We are assuming that agents only care about
their positions in the queue and their transfers. For any i ∈ N , let ui denote
the payoff function of agent i on Nn×R. We will assume that ui : Nn×R→ R
is such that ui(σi, ti) = vi(σi) + ti. Where for any i ∈ N , vi : Nn → R is such
that, for any a, b ∈ Nn if a ≤ b, then vi(a) ≥ vi(b). Thus for any i ∈ N , ui is
quasi-linear in transfers and all of the agents weakly prefer an earlier position
to a later position. For any i ∈ N define di : Nn × Nn → R as: for any
a, b ∈ Nn, di(a, b) = vi(a) − vi(b). Thus di(a, b) gives the difference between
the valuation of agent i from being in position a and being in position b.
Hence (N, u) is a queuing problem where N is a finite set of agents and
u = (ui)i∈N is a profile of payoff functions. A pair (σ, t) ∈ Π(N) × BB is a
solution to a queuing problem. Let Q be the set of all queuing problems. A
solution concept F is defined as F : Q→ 2Π(N)×Rn .
At a given solution if an agent i prefers the ordering and transfer of agent
j to his own ordering and transfer then it means that agent i envies agent j.
If for a given solution none of the agents envy any other agent then we say
that this solution is an envy free solution.
Definition 1 (Envy freeness, NE) For any (N, u) ∈ Q, a solution (σ, t) ∈
Π(N)×BB is envy free if and only if for any i, j ∈ N , ui(σi, ti) ≥ ui(σj, tj).
We use NE(N, u) to denote the set of envy free solutions of the problem
(N, u).
A solution (σ, t) Pareto dominates another solution (σ′, t′), if all of the
agents weakly prefer their orderings and transfers under (σ, t) to their order-
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ings and transfers under (σ′, t′), and there is at least one agent who strictly
prefers his ordering and transfer under (σ, t) to his ordering and transfer un-
der (σ′, t′). If a solution is not Pareto dominated by any other solution then
it is a Pareto efficient solution.
Definition 2 (Pareto efficiency, PE) For any (N, u) ∈ Q, a solution
(σ, t) ∈ Π(N) × BB is Pareto efficient if and only if there does not exist
(σ′, t′) ∈ Π(N)×BB such that for any i ∈ N , ui(σ′i, t′i) ≥ ui(σi, ti) and there
exists j ∈ N with ui(σ′j, t′j) > ui(σj, tj). We use PE(N, u) to denote the
Pareto efficient solutions of the problem (N, u).
For any given problem, an ordering is a maximal ordering if it maximizes
the sum of valuations of agents over the set of orderings. The set of maximal
orderings for the problem (N, u) will be denoted with Σmax(N, u), i.e.,
Σmax(N, u) = {σ ∈ Π(N)|∀σ′ ∈ Π(N) :
∑
i∈N
vi(σi) ≥
∑
i∈N
vi(σ
′
i)}.
Maximal orderings will play crucial roles in our results.
2.2 RESULTS
In the next lemma we will show that for any given problem, if a solution is an
envy free solution then the ordering of agents should be a maximal ordering.
Lemma 1 For all (N, u) ∈ Q, if σ ∈ Π(N)\Σmax(N, u), then for all t ∈ BB,
(σ, t) /∈ NE(N, u).
Proof Let σ ∈ Π(N) be such that, there exists σ′ ∈ Π(N) where∑
i∈N vi(σi) <
∑
i∈N vi(σ
′
i). Assume that there exists t ∈ BB such that
(σ, t) ∈ NE(N, u). So
∀i, j ∈ N ui(σi, ti) ≥ ui(σj, tj) .
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Therefore
∀i, j ∈ N vi(σi) + ti ≥ vi(σj) + tj .
Note that for all i ∈ N there exists j ∈ N such that σ′i = σj, which is given
by σ−1(σ′i). Hence
∀i ∈ N vi(σi) + ti ≥ vi(σ′i) + tσ−1(σ′i) .
Which implies
∑
i∈N
vi(σi) +
∑
i∈N
ti ≥
∑
i∈N
vi(σ
′
i) +
∑
i∈N
tσ−1(σ′i) .
Note that ∑
i∈N
tσ−1(σ′i) =
∑
i∈N
ti .
So ∑
i∈N
vi(σi) +
∑
i∈N
ti ≥
∑
i∈N
vi(σ
′
i) +
∑
i∈N
ti .
Hence ∑
i∈N
vi(σi) ≥
∑
i∈N
vi(σ
′
i) .
Which contradicts with
∑
i∈N vi(σi) <
∑
i∈N vi(σ
′
i). Hence (σ, t) /∈ NE(N, u).

By previous lemma we have seen that any envy free solution uses a max-
imal ordering to order the agents. By using this fact in the next lemma we
will show that any envy free solution is also a Pareto efficient solution.
Lemma 2 For all (N, u) ∈ Q, if (σ, t) ∈ NE(N, u) then (σ, t) ∈ PE(N, u)
Proof Let (σ, t) ∈ NE(N, u) by Lemma 1
∀σ′ ∈ Π(N)
∑
i∈N
vi(σi) ≥
∑
i∈N
vi(σ
′
i).
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Assume that there exists (σ, t) ∈ Π(N)×BB which Pareto dominates (σ, t).
So
∀i ∈ N vi(σi) + ti ≥ vi(σi) + ti ,
and
∃j ∈ N : vj(σj) + tj ≥ vj(σj) + tj .
Hence ∑
i∈N
vi(σi) +
∑
i∈N
ti >
∑
i∈N
vi(σi) +
∑
i∈N
ti.
Note that ∑
i∈N
ti =
∑
i∈N
ti = 0 .
So ∑
i∈N
vi(σi) >
∑
i∈N
vi(σi) .
Which contradicts with
∑
i∈N vi(σi) ≤
∑
i∈N vi(σi), concludes the proof. 
The next lemma states that if a solution is an envy free solution, then there
is a link between the difference between the transfers of agents and their
valuations on orderings. This result is due to payoff functions of agents being
quasi-linear in transfers.
Lemma 3 If (σ, t) ∈ NE(N, u) then for all i, j ∈ N such that σi < σj
di(σi, σj) ≥ tj − ti ≥ dj(σi, σj)
Proof Let (σ, t) ∈ NE(N, u), then for all i, j ∈ N such that σi < σj we have
vi(σi) + ti − vi(σj)− tj ≥ 0 ,
vj(σj) + tj − vj(σi)− ti ≥ 0 .
These two inequalities imply
vi(σi)− vi(σj) ≥ tj − ti ≥ vj(σi)− vj(σj) .
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Hence
di(σi, σj) ≥ tj − ti ≥ dj(σi, σj) .

As the previous lemma underlines the difference between the valuations of
agents on different positions in the queue is very curicial in constructing
the transfers. The next property is a restriction on the payoff functions of
the individuals. It says that, if agent i values the difference between two
consecutive positions more than the agent j does, then agent i will keep
valuing the difference between consecutive positions which come later in the
queue greater than or equal to agent j values these consecutive positions.
Definition 3 (Order Preservation Property, OPP ) A problem
(N, u) ∈ Q is said to satisfy order preservation property, if and only if
for all k ∈ Nn and for all i, j ∈ N if vi(k)− vi(k+1) ≥ vj(k)− vj(k+1) then
for all l ∈ Nn such that l ≥ k we have vi(l)− vi(l + 1) ≥ vj(l)− vj(l + 1).
Next we define a solution concept F . With F we order agents recursively,
by placing an agent in the first position if this agent’s difference between his
valuation on being in the first position and being in the second position is
greater than or equal to other agents’ differences between their valuations on
being in the first position and being in the second position. We keep placing
agents to the next positions by consulting the same reasoning. After arrang-
ing an ordering we construct transfers according to chosen ordering, while
constructing transfers we are keeping in mind the wisdom from Lemma 3.
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Define F : Q → 2Π(N)×Rn such that first order agents recursively by the
following algorithm:
σ−1(1) ∈ S1 = {i ∈ N |∀j ∈ N : di(1, 2) ≥ dj(1, 2)} ,
σ−1(2) ∈ S2 = {i ∈ N \ {σ−1(1)}|∀j ∈ N \ {σ−1(1)} :
di(2, 3) ≥ dj(2, 3)} ,
...
...
σ−1(k) ∈ Sk = {i ∈ N \ {σ−1(1), . . . , σ−1(k − 1)}|
∀j ∈ N \ {σ−1(1), . . . , σ−1(k − 1)} :
di(k, k + 1) ≥ dj(k, k + 1)} ,
...
...
σ−1(n− 1) ∈ Sn−1 = {i ∈ N \ {σ−1(1), . . . , σ−1(n− 2)}|
∀j ∈ N \ {σ−1(1), . . . , σ−1(n− 2)} :
di(n− 1, n) ≥ dj(n− 1, n)} ,
σ−1(n) ∈ Sn = {i ∈ N |N \ {σ−1(1), . . . , σ−1(n− 1)}} .
Note that there might be more than one ordering.
Without loss of generality assume that for any i ∈ N , σi = i.
Transfers are designed as: for k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}
if |Sk| > 1, then
tk+1 − tk = dk(k, k + 1);
if |Sk| = 1, then
tk+1 − tk ∈ [ max
l∈Sk+1
dl(k, k + 1), dk(k, k + 1))];
and
∑
i∈N ti = 0.
The next theorem states that, if a queuing problem satisfies the order
preservation property, then we are able to find all of the envy free solutions of
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this problem by using the solution concept F , furthermore all of the solutions
of F are envy free solutions of this problem.
Theorem 1 For all (N, u) ∈ Q, if (N, u) satisfies order preservation prop-
erty, then (σ, t) ∈ NE(N, u) if and only if (σ, t) ∈ F (N, u).
Proof (⇐) First we will prove that if (σ, t) ∈ F (N, u), then (σ, t) ∈
NE(N, u). Let (σ, t) ∈ F (N, u). Let i, j ∈ N and assume that σi < σj.
Without loss of generality let σi = i, σj = j. So
tj − ti =
j−i−1∑
l=0
(ti+l+1 − ti+l) .
We know from the construction of transfers via F that for all l ∈ {0, . . . , j −
i− 1},
ti+j+1 − ti+l ≤ di+l(i+ l, i+ l + 1) .
Which implies
tj − ti ≤
j−i−1∑
l=0
di+l(i+ l, i+ l + 1).
By using the definition of di(·, ·) we reach to
vi(i)− vi(j) =
j−i−1∑
l=0
(vi(i+ l)− vi(i+ l + 1)) =
j−i−1∑
l=0
di(i+ l, i+ l + 1).
From the construction of F we know that i ∈ Si so for all l ∈ {0, . . . , j−i−1},
di(i, i+ 1) ≥ di+l(i, i+ 1) .
Since order preservation property is satisfied for all l ∈ {0, . . . , j − i− 1},
di(i+ l, i+ l + 1) ≥ di+l(i+ l, i+ l + 1) .
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So
vi(i)− vi(j) =
j−i−1∑
l=0
di(i+ l, i+ l + 1) ≥
j−i−1∑
l=0
di+l(i+ l, i+ l + 1) ≥ tj − ti .
Therefore
ui(i, ti)− ui(j, tj) = vi(i)− vi(j)− (tj − ti) ≥ 0 .
Hence agent i does not envy agent j, i.e., None of the agents envy any other
agent who is ordered after himself.
Now we will show that agent j does not envy agent i. Recall that
tj − ti =
j−i−1∑
l=0
(ti+l+1 − ti+l).
For l ∈ {0, . . . , j − i− 1},
if |Si+l| > 1, then
ti+l+1 − ti+l = di+l(i+ l, i+ l + 1) .
If j ∈ Si+l, then
di+l(i+ l, i+ l + 1) = dj(i+ l, i+ l + 1) .
If j /∈ Si+l, then
di+l(i+ l, i+ l + 1) > dj(i+ l, i+ l + 1) .
If |Si+l| = 1, then i+ l = Si+l and j > i+ l hence i+ l 6= j. Then
ti+l+1 − ti+l ∈ [ max
k∈Si+l+1
dk(i+ l, i+ l + 1), di+l(i+ l, i+ l + 1)] .
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If j ∈ Si+l+1, then
max
k∈Si+l+1
dk(i+ l, i+ l + 1) ≥ dj(i+ l, i+ l + 1) .
If j /∈ Si+l+1, then assume that
dj(i+ l, i+ l + 1) > max
k∈Si+l+1
dk(i+ l, i+ l + 1) .
Since order preservation property is satisfied, for all k ∈ Si+l+1,
dj(i+ l + 1, i+ l + 2) ≥ dk(i+ l + 1, i+ l + 2) .
Then by definition j ∈ Si+l+1 which contradicts with j /∈ Si+l+1 . So
max
k∈Si+l+1
dk(i+ l, i+ l + 1) ≥ dj(i+ l, i+ l + 1) .
Therefore
tj − ti =
j−i−1∑
l=0
(ti+l+1 − ti+l) ≥
j−i−1∑
l=0
dj(i+ l, i+ l + 1).
By definition
vj(i)− vj(j) =
j−i−1∑
l=0
dj(i+ l, i+ l + 1) .
Which implies
vj(i)− vj(j) =
j−i−1∑
l=0
dj(i+ l, i+ l + 1) ≤ tj − ti .
Therefore
uj(j, tj)− uj(i, ti) = −(vj(i)− vj(j)) + tj − ti ≥ 0 .
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Hence agent j does not envy agent i, i.e., none of the agents envy any other
agent who is ordered before himself. So (σ, t) ∈ NE(N, u).
(⇒) Now we will prove that if (σ, t) ∈ NE(N, u), then (σ, t) ∈ F (N, u).
Let (σ, t) ∈ NE(N, u). Assume that (σ, t) /∈ F (N, u).
Part 1) Assume that we cannot construct σ with the ordering algorithm
which is defined in page 26. So there exists i, j ∈ N such that for some
k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} i ∈ Sk, j /∈ Sk but σj = k hence σi = l > k. Since
i ∈ Sk, j /∈ Sk we have di(k, k + 1) > dj(k, k + 1). Order preservation
property is satisfied, so for any n ∈ {1, . . . , l − k − 1}
di(k + n, k + n+ 1) ≥ dj(k + n, k + n+ 1) .
Which implies
di(k, l) =
l−k−1∑
n=0
di(k + n, k + n+ 1) >
l−k−1∑
n=0
dj(k + n, k + n+ 1) = dj(k, l) .
Hence di(k, l) > dj(k, l). Since (σ, t) ∈ NE(N, u) we have
vi(l) + ti − vi(k)− tj ≥ 0 ,
and
vj(k) + tj − vj(l)− ti ≥ 0 .
Therefore
vj(k)− vj(l) ≥ ti − tj ≥ vi(k)− vi(l) .
Hence
dj(k, l) ≥ di(k, l) .
Which contradicts with di(k, l) > dj(k, l). So we can construct σ with the
ordering algorithm which is defined in page 26.
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Part 2) Even though the ordering of agents is constructed by the algorithm
which is defined in page 26, the transfers are not defined as it is defined in
page 26.
A) For some k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} if |Sk| > 1.
Assume that tk+1 − tk 6= dk(k, k + 1), let i, j ∈ Sk and with out loss of
generality let σj = k so σi = l > k. For sake of simplicity rename agent j as
agent k and agent i as agent l. Since k, l ∈ Sk
dk(k, k + 1) = dl(k, k + 1) .
By order preservation property for any n ∈ {1, . . . , |N | − k − 1},
dk(k + n, k + n+ 1) = dl(k + n, k + n+ 1) .
So
dk(k, l) =
l−k−1∑
n=0
dk(k + n, k + n+ 1) =
l−k−1∑
n=0
dl(k + n, k + n+ 1) = dl(k, l) .
Since (σ, t) ∈ NE(N, u), by Lemma 3 we have
dk(k, l) ≥ tl − tk ≥ dl(k, l) .
Therefore
tl − tk =
l−k−1∑
n=0
dk(k + n, k + n+ 1) .
Hence
tl − tk−1 − tk = dk(k, k + 1) +
l−k−1∑
n=1
dk(k + n, k + n+ 1) .
But by assumption
tk+1 − tk 6= dk(k, k + 1) .
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And by Lemma 3
tk+1 − tk < dk(k, k + 1) .
Then
tl − tk+1 >
l−k−1∑
n=1
dk(k + n, k + n+ 1).
i) If k + 1 = l then 0 > 0 is a contradiction.
ii) If k + 1 < l by order preservation property
l−k−1∑
n=1
dk+n(k + n, k + n+ 1) ≤
l−k−1∑
n=1
dk(k + n, k + n+ 1) .
Therefore
tl − tk+1 >
l−k−1∑
n=1
dk+n(k + n, k + n+ 1) .
Then there exists m ∈ {k + 1, . . . , l − 1} such that
tm+1 − tm > dm(m,m+ 1) .
But by Lemma 3
tm+1 − tm ≤ dm(m,m+ 1) .
Since (σ, t) ∈ NE(N, u) we have
tm+1 − tm > dm(m,m+ 1) .
Which contradicts with
tm+1 − tm ≤ dm(m,m+ 1).
Hence tk+1 − tk = dk(k, k + 1).
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B) If |Sk| = 1. Assume that
tk+1 − tk /∈ [ max
j∈Sk+1
dj(k, k + 1), dk(k, k + 1)] .
By Lemma 3
tk+1 − tk ≤ dk(k, k + 1) .
Hence it should be the case that
tk+1 − tk < max
j∈Sk+1
dj(k, k + 1) .
Take
l ∈ {i ∈ Sk+1|∀j ∈ Sk+1 di(k, k + 1) ≥ dj(k, k + 1)} .
If l = k + 1, then
tk+1 − tk < dk+1(k, k + 1) .
Since (σ, t) ∈ NE(N, u) and again by Lemma 3
tk+1 − tk ≥ dk+1(k, k + 1) .
Which is a contradiction.
If l > k + 1, then k + 1, l ∈ Sk+1 so
dl(k + 1, k + 2) = dk+1(k + 1, k + 2) .
Since order preservation property is satisfied for all n ∈ {0, . . . , l − k − 2}
dl(k + 1 + n, k + n+ 2) = dk+1(k + 1 + n, k + n+ 2) .
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Hence
dl(k+1, l) =
l−k−2∑
n=0
dl(k+n+1, k+n+2) =
l−k−2∑
n=0
dk+1(k+n+1, k+n+2) = dk+1(k+1, l) .
By no envy
tl − tk+1 = dl(k + 1, l) .
Therefore
tl − tk < dl(k, l) .
Since (σ, t) ∈ NE(N, u) again by Lemma 3
tl − tk ≥ dl(k, l) .
which contradicts with
tl − tk < dl(k, l) .
Hence tk+1− tk ∈ [maxj∈Sk+1 dj(k, k+1), dk(k, k+1)]. So (σ, t) ∈ F (N, u). 
In the rest of the paper we are not assuming order preservation property
any more. The next lemma is a trivial statement but it will be very useful in
finding further results
Lemma 4 For all (N, u) ∈ Q σ ∈ Σmax(N, u) if and only if for all σ′ ∈
Π(N
∑
i∈N di(σi, σ
′
i) ≥ 0.
Proof Let σ ∈ Σmax(N, u) and σ′ ∈ Π(N) then
∑
i∈N
vi(σi) ≥
∑
i∈N
vi(σ
′
i) .
Hence ∑
i∈N
(vi(σi)− vi(σ′i)) ≥ 0 .
By definition
∀i ∈ N di(σi, σ′i) = vi(σi)− vi(σ′i) .
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Therefore ∑
i∈N
di(σi, σ
′
i) =
∑
i∈N
(vi(σi)− vi(σ′i)) ≥ 0 .
Let σ ∈ Π(N) be such that for all σ′ ∈ Π(N, u) we have∑i∈N di(σi, σ′i) ≥
0. Assume that there exists σ′ ∈ Π(N, u) such that ∑i∈N vi(σ′i) >∑
i∈N vi(σi). So ∑
i∈N
(vi(σ
′
i)− vi(σi)) > 0.
Thus ∑
i∈N
di(σ
′
i, σi) > 0.
Which implies ∑
i∈N
di(σi, σ
′
i) < 0.
But it contradicts with ∑
i∈N
di(σi, σ
′
i) ≥ 0.
This concludes the proof.

The next lemma states that for any queuing problem if we take a maximal
ordering and change the positions of agents, then the total losses of agents
who move to a later position in the queue is greater than the total gains of
the agents who move to an earlier position in the queu.
Lemma 5 For all (N, u) ∈ Q if σ ∈ Σmax(N, u) then for any sequence of
agents (ir)
k
i=1 such that i1 = ik and for any l, j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} il 6= ij we
have
k−1∑
r=1:
σir<σir+1
dir(σir , σir+1) ≥
k−1∑
r=1:
σir≥σir+1
dir(σir+1 , σir)
Proof Let σ ∈ Σmax(N, u) and let (ir)ki=1 be a sequence of agents such that
i1 = ik and for all l, j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, il 6= ij. Construct the ordering σ′
as: l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, σ′l = σ1+l and for all i ∈ N \ {(ir) : r ∈ {1, . . . , k}},
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σ′i = σi. Now σ
′ is another ordering. Since σ ∈ Σmax(N, u) by Lemma 4
∑
i∈N
di(σi, σ
′
i) ≥ 0 .
Which implies
n∑
i=1:
σi<σ
′
i
di(σi, σ
′
i) ≥
n∑
i=1:
σi≥σ′i
di(σ
′
i, σi) .
Due to the construction of σ′
n∑
i=1:
σi<σ
′
i
di(σi, σ
′
i) =
k−1∑
r=1:
σir<σir+1
dir(σir , σir+1) ,
and
n∑
i=1:
σi≥σ′i
di(σ
′
i, σi) =
k−1∑
r=1:
σir≥σir+1
dir(σir+1 , σir) .
Hence
k−1∑
r=1:
σir<σir+1
dir(σir , σir+1) ≥
k−1∑
r=1:
σir≥σir+1
dir(σir+1 , σir) .
This concludes the proof. 
Lemma 6 For any (N, u) ∈ Q if |N | = 3, then NE(N, u) 6= ∅
and (σ, t) ∈ NE(N, u) if and only if σ ∈ Σmax(N, u) and t2 − t1 ∈
[d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)], t3 − t2 ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)], t3 − t1 ∈ [max{d2(1, 2) +
d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}], and t1 + t2 + t3 = 0.
Proof Let σ ∈ Σmax(N, u) and without loss of generality let σ = (1, 2, 3).
From Lemma 5 we know that
i) d2(1, 2) ≤ d1(1, 2)
ii) d3(2, 3) ≤ d2(2, 3)
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iii) d3(1, 3) ≤ d1(1, 3)
If we add i to ii we obtain
iv) d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3) ≤ d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)
Again from Lemma 5
d3(1, 3) ≤ d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3) and d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3) ≤ d1(1, 3)
Hence
[d3(1, 3), d1(1, 3)]
⋂
[d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)] 6= ∅
so for any
z ∈ [max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
there exists
x ∈ [d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)]
and
y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)]
such that z = x+ y. Let (t1, t2, t3) ∈ R3 be such that
t2 − t1 = x , t3 − t2 = y and t1 + t2 + t3 = 0 .
37
Then, for agent 1
u1(1, t1)− u1(2, t2) = d1(1, 2)− x ≥ 0
u1(1, t1)− u1(3, t3) = d1(1, 3)− (x+ y) ≥ 0 .
Thus agent 1 does not envy other agents.
For agent 2
u2(2, t2)− u2(1, t1) = −d2(1, 2) + x ≥ 0
u2(2, t2)− u2(3, t3) = d2(2, 3)− y ≥ 0 .
So agent 2 does not envy other agents.
For agent 3
u3(3, t3)− u3(1, t1) = −d3(1, 3) + x+ y ≥ 0
u3(3, t3)− u3(2, t2) = −d3(2, 3) + y ≥ 0 .
so agent 3 does not envy other agents.
Hence (σ, t = (t1, t1 + x, t1 + x+ y)) ∈ NE(N, u)
Let (σ, t) ∈ NE(N, u). By Lemma 1 σ ∈ Σmax(N, u). For sake of
simplicity let σ = (1, 2, 3), by Lemma 3
t2 − t1 ∈ [d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)]
t3 − t2 ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)]
t3 − t1 ∈ [d3(1, 3), d1(1, 3)] .
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So there are only two cases to check. Assume that
t2 − t1 ∈ [d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)],
t3 − t2 ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)],
t3 − t1 /∈ [max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
Case 1) If d3(1, 3) ≤ t3 − t1 < d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)
t3 − t1 = t3 − t2 + t2 − t1
and
t3 − t2 ≥ d3(2, 3)
t2 − t1 ≥ d2(1, 2)
so
t3 − t1 ≥ d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)
is in contradiction with
t3 − t1 < d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)
Case 2) If d1(1, 3) ≥ t3 − t1 > d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)
t3 − t1 = t3 − t2 + t2 − t1
and
t3 − t2 ≤ d2(2, 3)
t2 − t1 ≤ d1(1, 2)
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so
t3 − t1 ≤ d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)
is in contradiction with
t3 − t1 > d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)

In next lemma we will carry our results to the case when n = 4.
Lemma 7 For any (N, u) ∈ Q if |N | = 4, then NE(N, u) 6= ∅ and (σ, t) ∈
NE(N, u) if and only if σ ∈ Σmax(N, u) and t2 − t1 ∈ [d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)] ,
t3−t2 ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)], t4−t3 ∈ [d4(3, 4), d3(3, 4)], t3−t1 ∈ [max{d2(1, 2)+
d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}], t4 − t2 ∈ [max{d3(2, 3) +
d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)},min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}],
t4− t1 ∈ [max{max{d3(2, 3)+ d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4), d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2)+ d4(3, 4)}+
max{d2(1, 2), d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3), d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)}, d4(1, 4)},
min{min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4), d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d3(3, 4)}+
min{d1(1, 2), d1(1, 3)− d3(2, 3), d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4)}, d1(1, 4)}]
such that t1 + t2 + t3 = 0.
From Lemma 6 we know that if there are only three agents we can find
envy free solutions. In the proof of Lemma 7 we will use this information. We
start by considering first three and last three agents in four person problem
seperately and by Lemma 6 we know that there is a set of envy free solutions
to both first three agents and last three agents problems. Note that there
are some agents which are both in first three and last three agents, agent 2
and agent 3. In the next step we check if the intersection of solutions for the
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transfer difference between agents 2 and 3 coming from the solutions to first
three agents’ and last three agents’ problems is nonempty or not. It turns out
that it is nonempty, hence we are able to connect two pieces of information.
The last thing we do is to check if there are solutions which make agent 1
and agent 4 envy free between themselves.
Proof Let σ ∈ Σmax(N, u) and without loss of generality let σ = (1, 2, 3, 4).
From Lemma 6 we know that there are x, y and y, z pairs satisfying
i)
x ∈ [d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)]
y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)]
and
x+ y ∈ [max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
ii)
y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)]
z ∈ [d4(3, 4), d3(3, 4)]
and
y + z ∈ [max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)},min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}]
Let
Y = {y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)] | ∃x ∈ [d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)] :
x+ y ∈ [max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
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If max(Y ) = d2(2, 3) then by Lemma 5
d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4)
d4(2, 4) ≤ d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4)
If max(Y ) 6= d2(2, 3) then d2(2, 3) /∈ Y , we know from Lemma 5 that
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} ≤ d2(2, 3) + d1(1, 2)
and
d2(2, 3) + d2(1, 2) ≤ d2(2, 3) + d1(1, 2)
then it should be the case that
min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)} < d2(2, 3) + d2(1, 2)
else d2(2, 3) ∈ Y . So it is the case that
d1(1, 3) < d2(2, 3) + d2(1, 2) ≤ d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3).
Since
d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d2(1, 2) = d1(1, 3),
then
d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2) ∈ Y,
so
max(Y ) ≥ d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2).
Assume that
max(Y ) > d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2)
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then
max(Y ) + d2(1, 2) > d1(1, 3)
hence max(Y ) /∈ Y which is a contradiction. Hence
max(Y ) ≤ d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2)
so
max(Y ) = d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2)
then by Lemma 5
d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d3(3, 4)
d4(2, 4) ≤ d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d3(3, 4)
so
max{d2(1, 2)+ d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} ≤ max{d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2)}+ d3(3, 4)
hence
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} ≤ max(Y ) + d3(3, 4) .
If min(Y ) = d3(2, 3) then by Lemma 5
d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4)
d2(2, 4) ≥ d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4)
If min(Y ) 6= d3(2, 3) then d3(2, 3) /∈ Y , we know from Lemma 5 that
min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)} ≥ d3(2, 3) + d2(1, 2)
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and
d3(2, 3) + d1(1, 2) ≥ d3(2, 3) + d2(1, 2)
then it should be the case that
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} > d3(2, 3) + d1(1, 2)
else d3(2, 3) ∈ Y . So it is the case that
d3(1, 3) > d3(2, 3) + d1(1, 2) ≥ d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3).
Since
d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d1(1, 2) = d3(1, 3),
then
d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) ∈ Y,
so
min(Y ) ≤ d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2).
Assume that
min(Y ) < d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2)
then
min(Y ) + d1(1, 2) < d3(1, 3)
hence min(Y ) /∈ Y which is a contradiction. Hence
min(Y ) ≥ d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2)
so
min(Y ) = d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2)
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then by Lemma 5
d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4)
d2(2, 4) ≥ d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4)
so
min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)} ≥ min{d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2)}+ d4(3, 4)
hence
min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)} ≥ min(Y ) + d4(3, 4).
Hence
[max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)},min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}]
⋂
[min{d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2)}+ d4(3, 4),
max{d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2)}+ d3(3, 4)] 6= ∅
so
[max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)},min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}]
⋂
[min(Y ) + d4(3, 4),max(Y ) + d3(3, 4)] 6= ∅
so there exists a triple x, y, z ∈ R+ such that
x ∈ [d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)]
y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)]
z ∈ [d4(3, 4), d3(3, 4)]
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x+ y ∈ [max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
y + z ∈ [max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)},min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}]
holds. For any such triple
y + z ∈ [max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4), d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4)},
min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4), d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d3(3, 4)}].
Let X be the set of x which satisfy above requirement with a (y, z) couple.
X = {x ∈ [d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)] | y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)], z ∈ [d4(3, 4), d3(3, 4)] :
x+y ∈ [max{d2(1, 2)+d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2)+d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}], y+
z ∈ [max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)},min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}]}
If min(X) = d2(1, 2) then by Lemma 5
d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d1(1, 4)
d2(1, 2) + d4(2, 4) ≤ d1(1, 4)
d2(1, 2) + d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d1(1, 4)
If min(X) 6= d2(1, 2) note that d2(1, 2)+d3(2, 3) ≤ min{d1(1, 3), d1(1, 2)+
d2(2, 3)} so
1) for all y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)]
y + d2(1, 2) < max{d3(1, 3), d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)}
hence
d2(2, 3) + d2(1, 2) < max{d3(1, 3), d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)}
so
d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3) ≤ d2(2, 3) + d2(1, 2) < d3(1, 3)
46
assume that
min(X) < d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3)
then
min(X) + d2(2, 3) < d3(1, 3)
so
min(X) /∈ X
which is a contradiction. Hence
min(X) ≥ d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3)
a) If min(X) = d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3) then by Lemma 5
d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3) + d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d1(1, 4)
d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3) + d4(2, 4) ≤ d1(1, 4)
d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3) + d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d1(1, 4)
b) If min(X) 6= d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3) note that letting y = d2(2, 3)
d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3) + d2(2, 3) = d3(1, 3) ∈
[max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
since
d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3) < d3(1, 3)
so for any y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)] such that
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} − d3(1, 3) + d2(2, 3) ≤ y
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≤ min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)} − d3(1, 3) + d2(2, 3)
and any z ∈ [d4(3, 4), d3(3, 4)]
y + z /∈ [max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)},min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}]
by Lemma 5
i)d1(1, 3)− d3(1, 3) + d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4)
ii)d1(1, 3)− d3(1, 3) + d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d4(2, 4)
iii)d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)− d3(1, 3) + d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4)
iv)d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)− d3(1, 3) + d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d4(2, 4)
so
min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)} − d3(1, 3) + d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4) ≥
max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)}
hence it should be the case that
min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)} <
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} − d3(1, 3) + d2(2, 3) + d4(3, 4)
by Lemma 5
i)d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d3(1, 3)− d3(1, 3) + d2(2, 3) + d4(3, 4)
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since in our case d3(1, 3) > d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3) and by Lemma 5
ii)d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)− d3(1, 3) + d2(2, 3) + d4(3, 4)
since in our case d3(1, 3) ≥ d2(1, 2) + d2(2, 3) and by Lemma 5
iii)d2(2, 4) ≥ d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)− d3(1, 3) + d2(2, 3) + d4(3, 4)
so it should be
iv)d2(2, 4) < d3(1, 3)− d3(1, 3) + d2(2, 3) + d4(3, 4).
Assume that
min(X) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)
then
d2(2, 4) < d3(1, 3)−min(X) + d4(3, 4)
so
min(X) /∈ X
which is a contradiction. Hence
min(X) ≥ d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)
A) In our case
d2(1, 2) < d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3)
and
d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)
hence
d2(1, 2) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)
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and by Lemma 5
d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) ≤ d1(1, 2)
hence
d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) ∈ [d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)]
B)
a) In our case
d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)
so
d3(1, 3) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) + d2(2, 3)
again in our case
d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3) < d3(1, 3)
so
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) + d2(2, 3)
b) By Lemma 5
d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) + d3(2, 3) ≤ min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}
so
[max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
⋂
[d3(1, 3)+d4(3, 4)−d2(2, 4)+d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)+d4(3, 4)−d2(2, 4)+d2(2, 3)] 6= ∅
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hence there exists y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)] such that
d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) + y ∈
[max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
C) a) by Lemma 5
i)d1(1, 3)− d3(1, 3)− d4(3, 4) + d2(2, 4) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4)
ii)d1(1, 3)− d3(1, 3)− d4(3, 4) + d2(2, 4) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d4(2, 4)
iii)d1(1, 2)+d2(2, 3)−d3(1, 3)−d4(3, 4)+d2(2, 4)+d3(3, 4) ≥ d3(2, 3)+d4(3, 4)
iv)d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)− d3(1, 3)− d4(3, 4) + d2(2, 4) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d4(2, 4)
so
min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)} − d3(1, 3)− d4(3, 4) + d2(2, 4) + d3(3, 4) ≥
max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)}
b) since −d3(1, 3)− d4(3, 4) + d2(2, 4) < −d3(1, 3) + d2(2, 3)
i)d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d3(1, 3)− d3(1, 3)− d4(3, 4) + d2(2, 4) + d4(3, 4)
ii)d2(2, 3)+d3(3, 4) ≥ d2(1, 2)+d3(2, 3)−d3(1, 3)−d4(3, 4)+d2(2, 4)+d4(3, 4)
iii)d2(2, 4) ≥ d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)− d3(1, 3)− d4(3, 4) + d2(2, 4) + d4(3, 4)
iv)d2(2, 4) = d3(1, 3)− d3(1, 3)− d4(3, 4) + d2(2, 4) + d4(3, 4)
so
min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)} ≥
51
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} − d3(1, 3)− d4(3, 4) + d2(2, 4) + d4(3, 4)
henced3(1, 3)+d4(3, 4)−d2(2, 4) ∈ X so min(X) = d3(1, 3)+d4(3, 4)−d2(2, 4).
By Lemma 5
d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) + d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d1(1, 4)
d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) + d4(2, 4) ≤ d1(1, 4)
d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) + d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d1(1, 4)
2) There exist y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)] such that
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} ≤
y + d2(1, 2) ≤ min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}
hence
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} ≤ d2(2, 3) + d2(1, 2)
so in this case
d3(1, 3) ≤ d2(2, 3) + d2(1, 2)
for any y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)] such that
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} − d2(1, 2) ≤
y ≤ min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)} − d2(1, 2)
and any z ∈ [d4(3, 4), d3(3, 4)]
y + z /∈ [max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)},min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}]
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by Lemma 5
i)d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4)
ii)d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d4(2, 4)
iii)d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4)
iv)d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d4(2, 4)
so
min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)} − d2(1, 2) + d3(3, 4) ≥
max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)}
hence it should be the case that
min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)} <
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} − d2(1, 2) + d4(3, 4)
since in this case d3(1, 3) ≤ d2(2, 3) + d2(1, 2) and by Lemma 5
i)d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d3(1, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d4(3, 4)
by Lemma 5
ii)d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d4(3, 4)
iii)d2(2, 4) ≥ d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d4(3, 4)
so it should be
iv)d2(2, 4) < d3(1, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d4(3, 4).
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Assume that
min(X) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)
then
d2(2, 4) < d3(1, 3)−min(X) + d4(3, 4)
so
min(X) /∈ X
which is a contradiction. Hence
min(X) ≥ d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)
A) In our case
d2(1, 2) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)
and by Lemma 5
d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) ≤ d1(1, 2)
hence
d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) ∈ [d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)]
B)
a) In this case
d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3) ≤ d2(1, 2) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)
so
d3(1, 3) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) + d2(2, 3)
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again in our case
d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3) ≤ d2(2, 3) + d2(1, 2)
so
d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)− d2(2, 3) ≤ d2(1, 2)
and
d2(1, 2) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)
hence
d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) + d2(2, 3)
so
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) + d2(2, 3)
b) By Lemma 5
d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) + d3(2, 3) ≤ min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}
so
[max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
⋂
[d3(1, 3)+d4(3, 4)−d2(2, 4)+d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)+d4(3, 4)−d2(2, 4)+d2(2, 3)] 6= ∅
hence there exists y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)] such that
d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) + y ∈
[max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
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C) a) by Lemma 5
i)d1(1, 3)− d3(1, 3)− d4(3, 4) + d2(2, 4) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4)
ii)d1(1, 3)− d3(1, 3)− d4(3, 4) + d2(2, 4) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d4(2, 4)
iii)d1(1, 2)+d2(2, 3)−d3(1, 3)−d4(3, 4)+d2(2, 4)+d3(3, 4) ≥ d3(2, 3)+d4(3, 4)
iv)d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)− d3(1, 3)− d4(3, 4) + d2(2, 4) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d4(2, 4)
so
min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)} − d3(1, 3)− d4(3, 4) + d2(2, 4) + d3(3, 4) ≥
max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)}
b) since −d3(1, 3)− d4(3, 4) + d2(2, 4) < −d2(1, 2)
i)d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d3(1, 3)− d3(1, 3)− d4(3, 4) + d2(2, 4) + d4(3, 4)
ii)d2(2, 3)+d3(3, 4) ≥ d2(1, 2)+d3(2, 3)−d3(1, 3)−d4(3, 4)+d2(2, 4)+d4(3, 4)
iii)d2(2, 4) ≥ d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)− d3(1, 3)− d4(3, 4) + d2(2, 4) + d4(3, 4)
iv)d2(2, 4) = d3(1, 3)− d3(1, 3)− d4(3, 4) + d2(2, 4) + d4(3, 4)
so
min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)} ≥
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} − d3(1, 3)− d4(3, 4) + d2(2, 4) + d4(3, 4)
henced3(1, 3)+d4(3, 4)−d2(2, 4) ∈ X so min(X) = d3(1, 3)+d4(3, 4)−d2(2, 4).
By Lemma 5
d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) + d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d1(1, 4)
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d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) + d4(2, 4) ≤ d1(1, 4)
d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4) + d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d1(1, 4)
so we have reached to the conclusion that
max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4), d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4)}+
max{d2(1, 2), d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3), d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)} ≤ d1(1, 4).
If max(X) = d1(1, 2) then by Lemma 5
d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d4(1, 4)
d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 4) ≥ d4(1, 4)
d1(1, 2) + d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d4(1, 4)
If max(X) 6= d1(1, 2) note that d1(1, 2)+d2(2, 3) ≥ max{d3(1, 3), d2(1, 2)+
d3(2, 3)} so
1) for all y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)]
y + d1(1, 2) > min{d1(1, 3), d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)}
hence
d3(2, 3) + d1(1, 2) > min{d1(1, 3), d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)}
so
d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3) ≥ d3(2, 3) + d1(1, 2) > d3(1, 3)
assume that
max(X) > d1(1, 3)− d3(2, 3)
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then
max(X) + d3(2, 3) < d1(1, 3)
so
max(X) /∈ X
which is a contradiction. Hence
max(X) ≤ d1(1, 3)− d3(2, 3)
a) If max(X) = d1(1, 3)− d3(2, 3) then by Lemma 5
d1(1, 3)− d3(2, 3) + d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d4(1, 4)
d1(1, 3)− d3(2, 3) + d2(2, 4) ≥ d4(1, 4)
d1(1, 3)− d3(2, 3) + d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d4(1, 4)
b) If max(X) 6= d1(1, 3)− d3(2, 3) note that letting y = d3(2, 3)
d1(1, 3)− d3(2, 3) + d3(2, 3) = d1(1, 3) ∈
[max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
since
d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3) > d3(1, 3)
so for any y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)] such that
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} − d1(1, 3) + d3(2, 3) ≤ y
≤ min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)} − d1(1, 3) + d3(2, 3)
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and any z ∈ [d4(3, 4), d3(3, 4)]
y + z /∈ [max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)},min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}]
by Lemma 5
i)d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 3) + d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4)
ii)d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 3) + d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d2(2, 4)
iii)d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)− d1(1, 3) + d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4)
iv)d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)− d1(1, 3) + d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d2(2, 4)
so
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} − d1(1, 3) + d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) ≤
min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}
hence it should be the case that
max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)} >
min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)} − d1(1, 3) + d3(2, 3) + d3(3, 4)
by Lemma 5
i)d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d1(1, 3)− d1(1, 3) + d3(2, 3) + d3(3, 4)
since in our case d1(1, 3) < d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3) and by Lemma 5
ii)d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)− d1(1, 3) + d3(2, 3) + d3(3, 4)
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since in our case d1(1, 3) < d1(1, 2) + d3(2, 3) and by Lemma 5
iii)d4(2, 4) ≤ d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)− d1(1, 3) + d3(2, 3) + d3(3, 4)
so it should be
iv)d4(2, 4) > d1(1, 3)− d1(1, 3) + d3(2, 3) + d3(3, 4).
Assume that
max(X) > d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4)
then
d4(2, 4) > d1(1, 3)−max(X) + d3(3, 4)
so
max(X) /∈ X
which is a contradiction. Hence
max(X) ≤ d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4)
A) In our case
d1(1, 2) > d1(1, 3)− d3(2, 3)
and
d1(1, 3)− d3(2, 3) > d1(1, 3) + d2(3, 4)− d4(2, 4)
hence
d1(1, 2) > d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4)
and by Lemma 5
d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) ≥ d2(1, 2)
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hence
d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) ∈ [d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)]
B)
a) In our case
d1(1, 3)− d3(2, 3) > d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4)
so
d1(1, 3) > d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) + d3(2, 3)
again in our case
d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3) > d1(1, 3)
so
min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)} > d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) + d3(2, 3)
b) By Lemma 5
d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) + d2(2, 3) ≥ max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)}
so
[max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
⋂
[d1(1, 3)+d3(3, 4)−d4(2, 4)+d3(2, 3), d1(1, 3)+d3(3, 4)−d4(2, 4)+d2(2, 3)] 6= ∅
hence there exists y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)] such that
d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) + y ∈
[max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
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C) a) by Lemma 5
i)d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 3)− d3(3, 4) + d4(2, 4) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4)
ii)d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 3)− d3(3, 4) + d4(2, 4) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d2(2, 4)
iii)d2(1, 2)+d3(2, 3)−d1(1, 3)−d3(3, 4)+d4(2, 4)+d4(3, 4) ≤ d2(2, 3)+d3(3, 4)
iv)d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)− d1(1, 3)− d3(3, 4) + d4(2, 4) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d2(2, 4)
so
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} − d1(1, 3)− d3(3, 4) + d4(2, 4) + d4(3, 4) ≤
min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}
b) since −d1(1, 3)− d3(3, 4) + d4(2, 4) > −d1(1, 3) + d3(2, 3)
i)d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d1(1, 3)− d1(1, 3)− d3(3, 4) + d4(2, 4) + d3(3, 4)
ii)d3(2, 3)+d4(3, 4) ≤ d1(1, 2)+d1(2, 3)−d1(1, 3)−d3(3, 4)+d4(2, 4)+d3(3, 4)
iii)d4(2, 4) ≤ d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)− d1(1, 3)− d3(3, 4) + d4(2, 4) + d3(3, 4)
iv)d4(2, 4) = d1(1, 3)− d1(1, 3)− d3(3, 4) + d4(2, 4) + d3(3, 4)
so
max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)} ≤
min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)} − d1(1, 3)− d3(3, 4) + d4(2, 4) + d3(3, 4)
henced1(1, 3)+d3(3, 4)−d4(2, 4) ∈ X so max(X) = d1(1, 3)+d3(3, 4)−d4(2, 4).
By Lemma 5
d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) + d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d4(1, 4)
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d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) + d2(2, 4) ≥ d4(1, 4)
d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) + d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d4(1, 4)
2) There exist y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)] such that
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} ≤
y + d1(1, 2) ≤ min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}
hence
min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)} ≥ d3(2, 3) + d1(1, 2)
so in this case
d1(1, 3) ≥ d3(2, 3) + d1(1, 2)
for any y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)] such that
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} − d1(1, 2) ≤
y ≤ min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)} − d1(1, 2)
and any z ∈ [d4(3, 4), d3(3, 4)]
y + z /∈ [max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)},min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}]
by Lemma 5
i)d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4)
ii)d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d2(2, 4)
iii)d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4)
iv)d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d2(2, 4)
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so
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} − d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4) ≤
min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}
hence it should be the case that
max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)} >
min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)} − d1(1, 2) + d3(3, 4)
since in this case d1(1, 3) ≥ d3(2, 3) + d1(1, 2) and by Lemma 5
i)d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d1(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d3(3, 4)
by Lemma 5
ii)d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d3(3, 4)
iii)d4(2, 4) ≤ d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d3(3, 4)
so it should be
iv)d4(2, 4) > d1(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d3(3, 4).
Assume that
max(X) > d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4)
then
d4(2, 4) > d1(1, 3)−max(X) + d3(3, 4)
so
max(X) /∈ X
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which is a contradiction. Hence
max(X) ≤ d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4)
A) In our case
d1(1, 2) ≥ d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4)
and by Lemma 5
d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) ≥ d2(1, 2)
hence
d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) ∈ [d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)]
B)
a) In this case
d1(1, 3)− d3(2, 3) ≥ d1(1, 2) > d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4)
so
d1(1, 3) > d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) + d3(2, 3)
again in our case
d1(1, 2) ≥ d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4)
and by Lemma 5
d2(2, 3) ≥ d3(2, 3)
so
d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3) ≥ d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) + d3(2, 3)
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so
min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)} ≥ d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) + d3(2, 3)
b)b) By Lemma 5
d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) + d2(2, 3) ≥ max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)}
so
[max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
⋂
[d1(1, 3)+d3(3, 4)−d4(2, 4)+d3(2, 3), d1(1, 3)+d3(3, 4)−d4(2, 4)+d2(2, 3)] 6= ∅
hence there exists y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)] such that
d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) + y ∈
[max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
C) a) by Lemma 5
i)d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 3)− d3(3, 4) + d4(2, 4) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4)
ii)d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 3)− d3(3, 4) + d4(2, 4) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d2(2, 4)
iii)d2(1, 2)+d3(2, 3)−d1(1, 3)−d3(3, 4)+d4(2, 4)+d4(3, 4) ≤ d2(2, 3)+d3(3, 4)
iv)d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)− d1(1, 3)− d3(3, 4) + d4(2, 4) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d2(2, 4)
so
max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)} − d1(1, 3)− d3(3, 4) + d4(2, 4) + d4(3, 4) ≤
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min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}
b) since −d1(1, 3)− d3(3, 4) + d4(2, 4) > −d1(1, 3) + d3(2, 3)
i)d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) ≤ d1(1, 3)− d1(1, 3)− d3(3, 4) + d4(2, 4) + d3(3, 4)
ii)d3(2, 3)+d4(3, 4) ≤ d1(1, 2)+d1(2, 3)−d1(1, 3)−d3(3, 4)+d4(2, 4)+d3(3, 4)
iii)d4(2, 4) ≤ d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)− d1(1, 3)− d3(3, 4) + d4(2, 4) + d3(3, 4)
iv)d4(2, 4) = d1(1, 3)− d1(1, 3)− d3(3, 4) + d4(2, 4) + d3(3, 4)
so
max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)} ≤
min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)} − d1(1, 3)− d3(3, 4) + d4(2, 4) + d3(3, 4)
henced1(1, 3)+d3(3, 4)−d4(2, 4) ∈ X so max(X) = d1(1, 3)+d3(3, 4)−d4(2, 4).
By Lemma 5
d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) + d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d4(1, 4)
d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) + d2(2, 4) ≥ d4(1, 4)
d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4) + d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d3(3, 4) ≥ d4(1, 4)
so we have reached to the conclusion that
min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4), d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d3(3, 4)}+
min{d1(1, 2), d1(1, 3)− d3(2, 3), d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4)} ≥ d4(1, 4).
Hence there exists x, y, z ∈ R+ such that
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x ∈ [d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)]
y ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)]
z ∈ [d4(3, 4), d3(3, 4)]
x+ y ∈ [max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
y + z ∈ [max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)},min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}]
x+y+z ∈ [max{max{d3(2, 3)+d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4), d3(1, 3)−d1(1, 2)+d4(3, 4)}+
max{d2(1, 2), d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3), d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)}, d4(1, 4)},
min{min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4), d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d3(3, 4)}+
min{d1(1, 2), d1(1, 3)− d3(2, 3), d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4)}, d1(1, 4)}]
Let t2 − t1 = x, t3 − t2 = y, t4 − t3 = z, such that
∑4
i=1 ti = 0 hence
for agent 1
u1(1, t1)− u1(2, t2) = d1(1, 2)− x ≥ 0
u1(1, t1)− u1(3, t3) = d1(1, 3)− (x+ y) ≥ 0
u1(1, t1)− u1(4, t4) = d1(1, 4)− (x+ y + z) ≥ 0
so agent 1 does not envy other agents.
For agent 2
u2(2, t2)− u2(1, t1) = −d2(1, 2)x ≥ 0
u2(2, t2)− u2(3, t3) = d2(2, 3)− y ≥ 0
u2(2, t2)− u2(4, t4) = d2(2, 4)− (y + z) ≥ 0
so agent 2 does not envy other agents.
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For agent 3
u3(3, t3)− u3(1, t1) = −d3(1, 3)x+ y ≥ 0
u3(3, t3)− u3(2, t2) = −d3(2, 3)y ≥ 0
u3(3, t3)− u3(4, t4) = d3(3, 4)− z ≥ 0
so agent 3 does not envy other agents.
For agent 4
u4(4, t4)− u4(1, t1) = −d4(1, 4)x+ y + z ≥ 0
u4(4, t4)− u4(2, t2) = −d4(2, 4)y + z ≥ 0
u4(4, t4)− u4(3, t3) = −d4(3, 4)z ≥ 0
so agent 4 does not envy other agents.
Let (σ, t) ∈ NE(N, u) so by Lemma 1 σ ∈ Σmax(N, u). For sake of
simplicity let σ = (1, 2, 3, 4), by Lemma 3
∀i ∈ {1, 2} ti+1 − ti ∈ [di+1(i, i+ 1), di(i, i+ 1)].
So
t2 − t1 ∈ [d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)],
t3 − t2 ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)],
t4 − t3 ∈ [d4(3, 4), d3(3, 4)],
t3 − t1 ∈ [d3(1, 3), d1(1, 3)],
t4 − t2 ∈ [d4(2, 4), d2(2, 4)],
t4 − t1 ∈ [d4(1, 4), d1(1, 4)].
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Assume that
t2 − t1 ∈ [d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)],
t3 − t2 ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)],
t3 − t1 /∈ [max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
Case 1) If d3(1, 3) ≤ t3 − t1 < d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)
t3 − t1 = t3 − t2 + t2 − t1
and
t3 − t2 ≥ d3(2, 3)
t2 − t1 ≥ d2(1, 2)
so
t3 − t1 ≥ d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3)
is in contradiction with
t3 − t1 < d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3).
Case 2) If d1(1, 3) ≥ t3 − t1 > d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)
t3 − t1 = t3 − t2 + t2 − t1
and
t3 − t2 ≤ d2(2, 3)
t2 − t1 ≤ d1(1, 2)
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so
t3 − t1 ≤ d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3)
is in contradiction with
t3 − t1 > d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3).
Assume that
t3 − t2 ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)],
t4 − t3 ∈ [d4(3, 4), d3(3, 4)],
t4 − t2 /∈ [max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)},min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}]
Case 1) If d4(2, 4) ≤ t4 − t2 < d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4)
t4 − t2 = t4 − t3 + t3 − t2
and
t4 − t3 ≥ d4(3, 4)
t3 − t2 ≥ d3(2, 3)
so
t4 − t2 ≥ d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4)
is in contradiction with
t4 − t2 < d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4).
Case 2) If d2(2, 4) ≥ t4 − t2 > d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4)
t4 − t2 = t4 − t3 + t3 − t2
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and
t4 − t3 ≤ d3(3, 4)
t3 − t2 ≤ d2(2, 3)
so
t4 − t2 ≤ d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4)
is in contradiction with
t4 − t2 > d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4).
Assume that
t2 − t1 ∈ [d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)]
t3 − t2 ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)]
t4 − t3 ∈ [d4(3, 4), d3(3, 4)]
t3 − t1 ∈ [max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
t4 − t2 ∈ [max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)},min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}]
t4− t1 /∈ [max{max{d3(2, 3)+ d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4), d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2)+ d4(3, 4)}+
max{d2(1, 2), d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3), d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)}, d4(1, 4)},
min{min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4), d1(1, 3)− d2(1, 2) + d3(3, 4)}+
min{d1(1, 2), d1(1, 3)− d3(2, 3), d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4)}, d1(1, 4)}]
Case 1)
t2 − t1 ∈ [d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)]
t3 − t2 ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)]
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t4 − t3 ∈ [d4(3, 4), d3(3, 4)]
t3 − t1 ∈ [max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
t4 − t2 ∈ [max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)},min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}]
but
d4(1, 4) ≤ t4−t1 < max{max{d3(2, 3)+d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4), d3(1, 3)−d1(1, 2)+d4(3, 4)}+
max{d2(1, 2), d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3), d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)}
1) If
t4 − t1 < d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) + d2(1, 2)
we know that
t4 − t1 = t4 − t3 + t3 − t2 + t2 − t1
and
t2 − t1 ≥ d2(1, 2),
t3 − t2 ≥ d3(2, 3),
t4 − t3 ≥ d4(3, 4).
Hence
t4 − t1 ≥ d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) + d2(1, 2)
contradicts with
t4 − t1 < d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) + d2(1, 2).
2) If
t4 − t1 < d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) + d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3)
73
then
t4 − t3 + t3 − t2 + t2 − t1 < d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) + d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3)
by Lemma 3
t4 − t3 ≥ d4(3, 4),
t3 − t2 ≥ d3(2, 3).
So
t2 − t1 < d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3)
so
t2 − t1 + d2(2, 3) < d3(1, 3)
by Lemma 3
t3 − t2 ≤ d2(2, 3)
so
t3 − t1 ≤ t2 − t1 + d2(2, 3) < d3(1, 3)
but
t3 − t1 < d3(1, 3)
contradicts with Lemma 3.
3) If
t4 − t1 < d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) + d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)
then
t4 − t3 + t3 − t2 + t2 − t1 < d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4) + d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)
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by Lemma 3
t4 − t3 ≥ d4(3, 4),
t3 − t2 ≥ d3(2, 3).
So
t2 − t1 < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)
so
t2 − t1 + d2(2, 4) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)
by Lemma 3
t4 − t2 ≤ d2(2, 4)
so
t4 − t1 ≤ t2 − t1 + d2(2, 4) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)
hence either
t4 − t3 < d4(3, 4)
or
t3 − t1 < d3(1, 3)
but by Lemma 3 it is both
t4 − t3 ≥ d4(3, 4)
t3 − t1 ≥ d3(1, 3)
which is a contradiction.
4) If
t4 − t1 < d4(2, 4) + d2(1, 2)
we know that
t4 − t1 = t4 − t3 + t3 − t2 + t2 − t1
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and by Lemma 3
t2 − t1 ≥ d2(1, 2),
t4 − t2 ≥ d4(2, 4).
Hence
t4 − t1 ≥ d4(2, 4) + d2(1, 2)
contradicts with
t4 − t1 < d4(2, 4) + d2(1, 2).
5) If
t4 − t1 < d4(2, 4) + d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3)
then
t4 − t3 + t3 − t2 + t2 − t1 < d4(2, 4) + d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3)
by Lemma 3
t4 − t2 ≥ d4(2, 4).
So
t2 − t1 < d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3)
so
t2 − t1 + d2(2, 3) < d3(1, 3)
by Lemma 3
t3 − t2 ≤ d2(2, 3)
so
t3 − t1 ≤ t2 − t1 + d2(2, 3) < d3(1, 3)
but
t3 − t1 < d3(1, 3)
contradicts with Lemma 3.
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6) If
t4 − t1 < d4(2, 4) + d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)
then
t4 − t3 + t3 − t2 + t2 − t1 < d4(2, 4) + d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)
by Lemma 3
t4 − t2 ≥ d4(2, 4).
So
t2 − t1 < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)
so
t2 − t1 + d2(2, 4) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)
by Lemma 3
t4 − t2 ≤ d2(2, 4)
so
t4 − t1 ≤ t2 − t1 + d2(2, 4) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)
hence either
t4 − t3 < d4(3, 4)
or
t3 − t1 < d3(1, 3)
but by Lemma 3 it is both
t4 − t3 ≥ d4(3, 4)
t3 − t1 ≥ d3(1, 3)
which is a contradiction.
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7) If
t4 − t1 < d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4) + d2(1, 2)
then
t4 − t3 + t3 − t2 + t2 − t1 < d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4) + d2(1, 2)
by Lemma 3
t2 − t1 ≥ d2(1, 2).
So
t4 − t2 < d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4)
so
t4 − t2 + d1(1, 2) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)
by Lemma 3
t2 − t1 ≤ d1(1, 2)
hence
t4 − t1 ≤ t4 − t2 + d1(1, 2) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)
hence either
t4 − t3 < d4(3, 4)
or
t3 − t1 < d3(1, 3)
but by Lemma 3 it is both
t4 − t3 ≥ d4(3, 4)
t3 − t1 ≥ d3(1, 3)
which is a contradiction.
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8) If
t4 − t1 < d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4) + d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3)
then
t4 − t3 + t3 − t2 + t2 − t1 < d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4) + d3(1, 3)− d2(2, 3)
by Lemma 3
t3 − t1 ≥ d3(1, 3).
So
t4 − t3 < d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 3)
so
t4 − t3 + d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)
by Lemma 3
t2 − t1 ≤ d1(1, 2),
and
t3 − t2 ≤ d2(2, 3).
Hence
t4 − t1 ≤ t4 − t3 + d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)
hence either
t4 − t3 < d4(3, 4)
or
t3 − t1 < d3(1, 3)
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but by Lemma 3 it is both
t4 − t3 ≥ d4(3, 4)
t3 − t1 ≥ d3(1, 3)
which is a contradiction.
9) If
t4 − t1 < d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4) + d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)
then
t4−t3+t3−t2+t2−t1 < d3(1, 3)−d1(1, 2)+d4(3, 4)+d3(1, 3)+d4(3, 4)−d2(2, 4)
by Lemma 3
t3 − t1 ≥ d3(1, 3),
t4 − t3 ≥ d4(3, 4).
So
0 < d3(1, 3)− d1(1, 2) + d4(3, 4)− d2(2, 4)
hence
d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 4) < d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)
but by Lemma 5
d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 4) ≥ d3(1, 3) + d4(3, 4)
which is a contradiction.
Case 2)
t2 − t1 ∈ [d2(1, 2), d1(1, 2)]
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t3 − t2 ∈ [d3(2, 3), d2(2, 3)]
t4 − t3 ∈ [d4(3, 4), d3(3, 4)]
t3 − t1 ∈ [max{d2(1, 2) + d3(2, 3), d3(1, 3)},min{d1(1, 2) + d2(2, 3), d1(1, 3)}]
t4 − t2 ∈ [max{d3(2, 3) + d4(3, 4), d4(2, 4)},min{d2(2, 3) + d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4)}]
but
d1(1, 4) ≥ t4−t1 > min{min{d2(2, 3)+d3(3, 4), d2(2, 4), d1(1, 3)−d2(1, 2)+d3(3, 4)}+
min{d1(1, 2), d1(1, 3)− d3(2, 3), d1(1, 3) + d3(3, 4)− d4(2, 4)}
The proof of this part is very similar to Case 1).

I conjecture that this result may be carried to the general case inductively.
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Chapter 3
CONCLUSION
In our model the capacity of the facility is unlimited just like Maniquet
(2003)’s, Chun (2004a)’s, Kayi & Ramaekers (2006)’s, Moulin (2004)’s,
Moulin (2005)’s, and O¨zsoy (2005)’s models. The job lengths of individuals
are identical like Maniquet (2003)’s, Chun (2004a)’s, and Kayi & Ramaek-
ers (2006)’s models. The difference between our model and other models is
that we are considering more general preferences for agents than other models
do. In Moulin (2004)’s, Moulin (2005)’s, and O¨zsoy (2005)’s models all of the
agents value cost of waiting for a unit of time similarly but in our model these
valuations may be different. In Maniquet (2003)’s, Chun (2004a)’s, and Kayi
& Ramaekers (2006)’s models each agent has an impatience level hence the
difference between any two consecutive positions is equal for an agent. In our
model an agent may value the difference between two different consecutive
positions differently.
Our first result is that if a solution is an envy free solution, then the order-
ing of agents should be a maximal ordering. Since numeric representation of
preferences of agents are quasi-linear in transfers any envy free solution is also
a Pareto efficient solution. If order preservation property is satisfied, then we
are able to characterize envy free solutions by using the solution concept F .
Even if order preservation property is not satisfied I conjecture that set of
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envy free solutions are not empty. Up to four agents we have characterized
the envy free solutions. Generalizing this result is an open problem. I think
that in generalizing this result the properties of maximal orderings which are
explored in this study will play a key role.
A natural extension of this study is limiting the capacity of the facility,
and studying with non-identical job lengths. Taking more general preferences
of agents might be another option. Since envy freeness is a fairness notion,
one might study other fairness notions such as identical preferences lower
bound under this or under a more general model. Best of my knowledge
there is not much solution concepts defined for queuing problems. We have
introduced the solution concept F in this study, one might come up with
different solution concepts for queuing problems.
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